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Abstract—Privacy in form of anonymous communication
could be comparably both faster and harder to break in optical
routers than in today’s anonymous IP networks based on The
Onion Routing (Tor). Implementing the practical privacy all-
optically, however, is not straightforward, as it requires key
generation in each anonymization node to avoid distribution
of long keys, and layered encryption, both at the optical line
rate. Due to the unavailability of cryptographically strong optical
key generation and encryption components, not only a layered
encryption is a challenge, but an optical encryption in general.
In this paper, we address the challenges of optical anonymous
networking for the first time from the system’s perspective, and
discuss options for practical implementation of all-optical layered
encryption. To this end, we propose an optical anonymization
component realized with the state-of-the-art optical XOR logic
and optical Linear Feedback Shift Registers (oLFSRs). Given
that LFSR alone is known for its weak cryptographic security
due to its linear properties, we propose an implementation with
parallel oLFSRs and analyze the resulting computational security.
The results show that proposed optical anonymization component
is promising as it can be practically realized to provide a high
computational security against deanonymization (privacy) attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The onion routing (Tor) is the most popular anonymous
routing, implemented as an overlay network among volunteer
IP layer systems. Tor deploys the so-called onion routers
(ORs) that are communicating using pairwise TCP connec-
tions, whereby anonymous communication is possible with
layered encryption through traffic tunneling over a chain of
ORs. Even though Tor is best known to providing anonymous
communication to the end-nodes, also the network providers
appreciate the Tor design principles as they can be used to
prevent traffic analysis performed by an adversary. In Tor, the
original data is encrypted multiple times (layered encryption),
and along the path each selected OR decrypts one layer of
encryption prior to forwarding, ”peeling the onion.” While the
layered encryption feature makes Tor a de-facto solution for
anonymous networking, it creates at the same time the main
performance drawback, resulting in an unbalanced distribution
of Internet traffic due to tunneling, and a large processing
delay in ORs. This motivates our interest in investigating
whether anonymous and secure routing can be implemented
in the optical layer. For a starter, Internet tunneling can be
implemented with wavelength circuits, and the processing
performance can be improved with all-optical processing.
To support privacy in optical networks, as well as security,
a few challenges need to be addressed from the system’s
perspective. First, we need to integrate two basic optical
components: an optical encryption component and an optical
key generator. Second, we need optical layered encryption.
Optical encryption device is essential, whereby optical data
needs to be logically combined with the secure key. The
key generation is also critical, as it needs to implemented in
each node to avoid the distribution of a long anonymization
keys over the network or large buffers for key storage. The
key generation, however, does not only need to be realized
all-optically, but it must provide a cryptographically secure
long key, as well as be performed at line rate. Two state-of-
the-art optical components can be used to this end: optical
XOR (oXOR) and optical Linear Feedback Shift Registers
(oLFSRs). oXOR has been proposed as a practical symmetric
key cryptography choice as it can easily concatenate plain text
with a key [1]–[4], however has not been used yet for layered
encryption. LFSR is simple to implement all-optically based on
a shift register and oXORs [2]. Since LFSR is however known
for its weak cryptographic security, it cannot be included in
the system in a straightforward fashion [5].
In this paper, we propose a practical solution for all-optical
layered encryption and key generation, while addressing the
issue of weak cryptographic security of LFSR from the sys-
tem’s perspective. In our system, we utilize an electronic non-
linear pseudo random number generator (pRNG) to provide
parameters for configuration of an Optical Key Generator
(oKG) based on oLFSRs; this is in contrast to the common
usage of pRNG which is for the actual key generation in
electronics, and not for configuration of key generation. To
generate a key with a high level of computational security and
at line speed, we propose to use multiple parallel oLFSRs,
each corresponding to different generator polynomial, and, in
addition, to periodically switch between them, reset of oKG.
We investigate the computational security of proposed system
by assuming a deanonymization attack. Based on the security
analysis we reverse engineer the system parameters required
for practical realization of oKG such as the oLFSR length,
number of parallel LFSRs, maximal key length, number of
required resets, line rate adaptation as well as switching time
between parallel oLFSRs. The results show that the proposed
all-optical layered encryption can be practically implemented
and provide high level of computational security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the system, along with the anonymization components
proposed. System analysis is presented in Section 3. Numerical
results are shown in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
A. Optical ”ToR” network
Fig.1 illustrates an anonymous optical network based on the
traditional optical WDM network, with configurable optical
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Fig. 1: Optical transmission system with layered encryption capability. Ki: key; M : original data; Mi: data encrypted with Ki.
cross connects. We assume that the optical control plane
is able to assign wavelengths, perform routing and resource
allocation, and in addition control the configuration of the
anonymization components. The anonymization components
are added to the traditional cross connect architecture and
include pseudo-random number generator (pRNG), optical key
generator (oKG) and optical encryption component based on
optical XOR (oXOR) [6]–[8]. The only component imple-
mented in electronics is pRNG, and it requires electro-optical
conversion. In our approach, we implement pRNG at the
transmission speeds comparably lower than the related optical
line rate, and use the output of that pRNG to configure oKG
such that a long secure bit sequences at line rate can be
produced as a key in each anonymization node on the circuit.
Once the pseudo random bit sequence is converted into optical
signal, it is interpreted by oKG as parameters for generation
of anonymization key. This combination of a low rate pRNG
and high-bit rate oKG is one of the salient features of our
proposed architecture, since cryptographically strong pRNGs
at typical optical line rates are not yet available. Once the key
is generated, it is combined with the optical data in the optical
encryption component. The optical encryption component with
oXOR can insert or remove encryption layers by applying
anonymization keys generated by oKG.
Similarly to Tor, we distinguish between source and
anonymization nodes. The source node inserts as many encryp-
tion layers as there are anonymization nodes along the circuit
(in Tor it is 3). The anonymization nodes on the circuit remove
one encryption layer each. For illustration, let us consider an
example of a circuit setup between nodes A (source) and E
(destination), with two hops, and an anonymization node C
in between. Once the circuit is established, the control plane
distributes the start value, for instance an initialization (INI)
signal, for each pRNG utilized on the circuit, whereby pRNG
produces random parameters for generation of anonymization
key. The original data M in source is layered encrypted with
two keys K1 and K2, i.e., of nodes C and E, by applying oXOR
operation. The XOR operation transforms the original data M
of length LM into a new bit sequence Mi = [M ⊕Ki] by ap-
plying a key Ki of length LK = LM related to anonymization
node i and, thus, anonymizes the communication on the circuit.
The anonymization in anonymization nodes, i.e., decryption,
is implemented by applying the same key Ki with XOR
operation as follows Mi ⊕ Ki = [M ⊕ Ki ⊕ Ki] = M . In
Fig.1, the source A encrypts the original data M in layers
as M1 = [M ⊕ K2 ⊕ K1], whereby nodes C and E remove
one encryption layer by decryption. When encrypted optical
data M1 reaches the next node C, it is anonymized, i.e.,
decrypted, with the same key K1 as applied by source, i.e.,
[M1⊕K1] = [M ⊕K2⊕K1⊕K1] = [M ⊕K2] =M2. In the
destination E, encrypted optical data M2 is decrypted with the
anonymization key K2 as [M2⊕K2] = [M ⊕K2⊕K2] =M ,
converted to electronic signal and then sent to the higher layers.
B. Anonymization components
Fig. 2 zooms into the main anonymization components
proposed, including the oKG based on parallel oLFSRs and
the optical layered encryption, based on an oXOR encryption
loop. For these components to work, pRNG from the electronic
layer is required to configure oKG in any anonymization node.
This is necessary since there is no optical implementation of
cryptographically strong pRNGs. Therefore, the bit rate CR
of electronic sequence from pRNG is generally much lower
(up to 1.3 Gb/s [9], [10]) than the line rate C of optical data.
The pRNG generates a bit sequence R = [p′, h] of length LR,
which we refer to as true secret key. The oKG interprets the
true secret key R as its parameters for configuration, whereby
p′ corresponds to the index of an oLFSR to be used, and h is
the seed used by that oLFSR. This simple mechanisms makes it
possible to enhance the electronic bit sequence R from pRNG
from a short secret key at low bit rates in electronics, into a
long anonymization key Ki at optical line rate.
1) Optical Key Generator (oKG): As previously men-
tioned, pRNG generates a true secret key, R, i.e., index p′
to select oLFSR for key generation and the seed h used as
an oLFSR start sequence. Since pRNG is initialized with
predefined start value (INI.Signal) in all optical nodes along
the circuit, pRNGs in the source and any anonymization nodes
generate the same pseudo random numbers, i.e., the same
Fig. 2: Anonymization components proposed; p′: bit stream to
choose oLFSR; h: LFSR seed of n bits; M : original data; Mi:
data Mi+1 encrypted with a key Ki of anonymization node i;
CR: bit rate of pRNG; C: line rate; P : number of oLFSRs in
oKG; ki: a part of key Ki generated during reset cycle.
parameters (p′, h) for oKG. Thus, oKG along the routes are
synchronized and generate the same anonymization keys Ki.
The optical LFSR extends a short input start sequence (seed
h from pRNG) into a long output sequence and to operate at
optical line rate, e.g., up to 250 Gbit/s [2], whereby clocking
signal implemented by RZ laser at the same speed sends
optical signal (a series of logical ones) at line rate to determine
the data-rate of the oLFSR [11]. However, LFSR is known
for a weak cryptographic security [5], [12], due to its linear
properties. To this end, we propose in this paper two system
modifications to increase the computational security, i.e., the
time complexity for guessing the anonymization key. The first
modification includes an implementation of parallel oLFSRs.
The second is the key reset.
The idea behind parallel oLFSRs related is to have a choice
of different generator polynomials, whereby any oLFSR p′
for generation of anonymization key is defined randomly by
pRNG. oKG can include P , 1 ≤ P ≤ Pmax, oLFSRs, where
Pmax = ϕ(2
n − 1)/n is a maximal number of primitive
irreducible polynomials of degree n (ϕ(·) is Euler function).
Fig. 2 shows an all-optical implementation of oKG based on
P oLFSRs, where shift registers have a fixed size of n bits
and require seeds h of the same length n. From this register, a
set of fixed bits denoted as bt and bj , each corrsonding to the
utilized generator polynomial, are XOR concatenated and the
resulting bit bn is fed to the shift register at the last position
(n), whereby the sequence in the register is 1-bit shifted [3].
The second proposed modification is reset of oKG, i.e.,
periodically switching between oLFSRs with its reinitialization
by random seed h. We refer to the time between two resets as
reset cycle. During any reset cycle, a randomly selected oLFSR
generates only a part ki of anonymization key Ki, whereby
N reset cycles, i.e., resets, are required to generate a whole
anonymization key Ki, i.e., Ki = [k1i , k
2
i , ..., k
N
i ]. Thus, the
anonymization key Ki of length LK is generated by multiple
randomly selected oLFSRs one by one during N reset cycles
and consists of N key parts ki of length Lk, i.e., LK = NLk.
2) Optical Layered Encryption: Typically, layered encryp-
tion in Tor is implemented with Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) with a key length 128 bits [13], which is modified
multiple times with Rijndael’s key schedule and XOR con-
catenated with data. To implement layered encryption all-
optically, we propose the following method. The original data
M in the source is XOR concatenated into Mi+1 with any
anonymization keys of nodes from r to i+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, where
r is a number of anonymization nodes on a circuit. To insert an
additional encryption layer, the encrypted optical data Mi+1 is
fed back to the oXOR gate and encrypted into Mi with a key
Ki, Mi = [Mi+1⊕Ki] = [M⊕Kr⊕...⊕Ki+1⊕Ki]. When all
r keys from Kr to K1 are applied, the optical data M1 leaves
the encryption loop. To remove an encryption layer, optical
data Mi arrived at anonymization node i, is XOR concatenated
with the same key Ki such as in source into optical data Mi+1
sent to the next anonymization node i+ 1.
C. A numerical example
Fig. 3 shows an example of layered optical encryption,
whereby oKG is implemented with two oLFSRs of length
n = 3, i.e., based on two different generator polynomials of
degree 3, i.e., g(b) = b3 + b + 1 and g(b) = b3 + b2 + 1.
Generator polynomials define bits in shift register for XOR
concatenation. Thus, in oLFSR 1, these are bits on the first
and last position in register (b3 and b1). Each oLFSR can
generate without repeats at most 7 sequences of maximal
length 7 bits each. Each sequence is defined by a cyclic group,
which describes possible seeds and related output sequences.
We assume that oKG utilizes the oLFSR1 if it receives bit
p′ =’0’ from pRNG, otherwise oLFSR2. The original data M
consists of LM = 10 bits, while N = 2 resets are required to
generate anonymization key Ki of the same length LK = 10
bits, i.e., key consists of 2 parts k1i and k
2
i of Lk = 5 bits
each. Let’s assume the circuit of 3 nodes as presented in Fig.
1, i.e., 2 anonymization nodes (C and E) on the circuit. Thus,
two encryption layers, i.e., two keys K1 and K2, are required.
When optical data M arrives at the source, pRNG is
first initialized by an INI. E signal of destination. oKG
receives the first configuration bits [p′, h1] =’0101’ from
pRNG, i.e., p′ =’0’ and seed h1 =’101’, and writes seed
bits in shift register of oLFSR 1. The first generated key
part k12 is a sequence ’00111’, while bits related to seeds
are always skipped, e.g., bits ’101’ of seed h1 do not belong
to the key sequence k12 . During the first reset cycle, oKG
receives next sequence [p′, h2] =’1100’ from pRNG and
writes seed h2 =’100’ into shift register of the oLFSR 2,
p′ =’1’. The second part of key is k22 =’10111’ and the
resulting anonymization key is K2 = [k12, k
2
2] =’0011110111’.
The original data M =’1001101011’ is then XOR concate-
nated with K2 resulting in encrypted data for the second
Fig. 3: Example of layered optical encryption system with two oLFSRs of length 3.
anonymization node M2 =’1010011100’, which is fed back
to the oXOR gate. At the same time, the oKG generates the
second anonymization key K1. The pRNG is now initialized
with INI.C value of the first anonymization node C and
generates pseudo random bits [p′, h3, p′, h4] =’10100110’ for
both reset cycles. By utilizing seeds h3=’010’ and h4=’110’,
the streams generated with oLFSR 2 and then oLFSR 1 are
k11 =’11100’ and k
2
1 =’10011’, respectively. The resulting key
K1 =’1110010011’ is XOR concatenated with M2 into data
M1 =’0100001111’ sent to the first anonymization node.
III. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
A. Deanonymization attack model
The deanonymization attack is modelled as the attacker’s
attempt to eavesdrop the optical signal with the goal to both
guess the source and destination of the optical circuit (routing),
as well as the content of the optical data flow. We assume
that the attacker can eavesdrop on any incoming and outgoing
optical fibers of an anonymization node i. Thus, to correlate
input and output port of certain optical flow, and reveal the
routing, the attacker needs to guess an anonymization key
Ki of node i for certain optical flow, decrypt it and finally
compare the deanonymized flow with all outgoing flows of
node i. To decrypt the data, an attacker needs to guess all K
anonymization keys applied, 1 ≤ K ≤ r, and remove all K
encryption layers. We assume that an encryption layer can be
only removed, if the optical data of length LM is decrypted
(whole data). We also assume that the attacker knows the
structure of the oKG utilized, including the usage of LFSRs
(which is a common assumption). Therefore, the attacker can
generate anonymization keys by utilizing the correct sequence
of LFSRs (set of p′), and correct related seeds (set of h), i.e.,
correct bit sequence of true secret key from pRNG. Since
we do not consider attacks on control plane and assume
control channel as perfectly secure and pRNG as unbreakable,
an attacker would not be able to predict input and output
sequences of pRNG and must perform a Brute Force Attack
(BFA) to guess the true secret key, and finally the original data.
B. Security analysis
Given the attacker model, let us first analyze the time
required for removing one encryption layer. To this end,
the attacker needs to try all P different LFSRs, or related
polynomials for any key part ki and all (2n − 1) seeds for
each tested oLFSR p′. To guess the key Ki, an attacker must
try out all PN combinations of oLFSRs utilized. Then, the
time required to remove one encryption layer is
T b = PN · τ · (2n − 1), (1)
where τ is a time required for decryption of one key, while
time for generation of one binary key sequence Ki is set to
zero, since an attacker can pre-generate some keys.
To reveal the path (routing), the incoming optical data need
to be encrypted with related anonymization key and compared
with all outgoing optical flows. If we neglect the time for
comparison, the time required to find out the relation between
incoming and outgoing optical data is defined by Eq. (1).
Furthermore, the time to find out the whole circuit with r
anonymization nodes is defined as T L = r · T b. When an
attacker reveals the original data M , the eavesdropped optical
data Mi must be decrypted with all K out of r anonymization
keys. Let us consider the worst case scenario, where the
attacker knows or is able to define the path or parts of the
path during the decryption process, such as when optical data
have already traversed r − K out of r anonymization nodes.
As a result, the time required to reveal the secret data is
TM = K · T b (2)
C. Reverse engineering of the system parameters
Given the requirement on high computational security
against the deanonymisation attacks, we now derive the re-
quired parameters for practical implementation of the proposed
system. The parameters we consider include the switching time
of oKG, optimal key length Lk and minimal required bit rate
of pRNG assuming the minimal number of resets N .
1) Switching time in oKG: The time for switching between
parallel oLFSRs must be not larger than the reset cycle trc.
Thus, the optical 1 : P switch in oKG (Fig. 2) must be able to
switch to the next oLFSR during the shortest reset cycle, which
is defined as a time to generate one part ki of anonymization
key Ki at line rate C, i.e.,
trc = Lk/C (3)
2) Optimal key length: We define an optimal key length
Lk generated by oLFSR during reset cycle trc as a length
that is larger than the true secret key R generated by pRNG
during the same time, Lk > LR, whereby optimal key ki is
generated with minimal number of resets N and has no repeats
of bit sequence. The first condition, Lk > LR, ensures that
the required bit rate of pRNG is not larger than the line rate
(and is always true). The second condition reduces switching
speed, while the third condition defines the cryptographic
quality of the key sequence. However, since the length LM of
optical data M can be very large (Gbits), we generally allow
a short oLFSR length, n, which is less than log2(Lk + 1),
Lk << LM . Thus, we allow that oLFSR generates a key part
ki during multiple LFSR cycles with a possible repeat of the
same bit sequence. That is because oLFSRs based on primitive
irreducible polynomials of degree n can generate at most 2n−1
bits without sequence repeat. We now derive the optimal key
length to provide high computational security.
The maximal key length Lk generated during a reset cycle
is generally a function of the number of implemented oLFSRs
P and its length n, whereby the time for removing of one
encryption layer, T b, defined by Eq.(1), and the time for
one decoding try τ can be set to a very long computational
time (years) and defined by the state-of-the-art technology,
respectively. Let us modify the equation for T b to inequation,
whereby the left hand side must be larger than or equal to the
right hand side of the Eq. (1). Since the key length Lk of a key
part ki generated between two resets is smaller than the length
of original data M , i.e., Lk << LM , the number of required
resets N corresponds to the ratio between Lk and LM , i.e.,
N = LM/Lk (4)
With Eq. (4), Eq. (1) can be modified as T
b
τ(2n−1) ≥ P
LM
Lk ,
i.e., LM log2(P ) ≥ Lklog2
(
T b
τ(2n−1)
)
, yielding the optimal
key length generated during a reset cycle as
Lk ≤ LM log2(P )
log2
(
T b
τ(2n−1)
) . (5)
3) pRNG bit rate: In any reset cycle trc, the switching
between oLFSRs can generally lead to key generation interrup-
tions, which happens when the same oLFSR is chosen during
two sequent reset cycles. To avoid this, we can initialize one
oLFSR at the same time when another oLFSR is generating
a key. On the other hand, such system configurations can
significantly reduce the space of possible anonymization keys
and, thus, negatively impact the computational security defined
by Eq. (1), as it follows that Tˆ b = P ·(P−1)(N−1) ·τ ·(2n−1).
To maintain the high computational security in presence of
interruptions, the pRNG bit rate plays a large role.
Generally, the oLFSR can be selected two times succes-
sively with probability 1P resulting in key generation interrup-
tion, while, with probability P−1P , the key generation is without
interruption. If we have interruptions, an electrical or optical
buffer can be beneficial, whereby bit sequence from pRNG is
generated and stored during reset cycle t1rc = t
1
R, where t
1
R is
a time for generation of random binary numbers p′ (oLFSR)
of log2(P ) bits and h (seed) of n bits. During the same reset
cycle, t1rc = t
1
L, oLFSR should in the worst case write and
skip n seed bits into and from shift register, respectively, and,
finally, generate a key part ki of length Lk. Thus, pRNG and
oLFSR generate n+ log2(P ) bits and 2n+Lk bits within one
reset cycle, respectively. Let us assume a bit rate of pRNG and
oLFSR as CR and CL, respectively. Thus, the reset cycle is
defined as t1rc =
2n+Lk
CL
≥ n+log2(P )CR and the minimal required
bit rate of pRNG in case of interruption is
C1R ≥ (n+log2(P ))CL2n+Lk (6)
In the second case, i.e., key generation without interrup-
tions, the period for oLFSR initialization, t2ini = t
2
R+t
2
skip, i.e,
time t2R for generation of p
′ and h and time t2skip for skipping
of seed bits by new selected oLFSR p′, must be not larger
than the period t2L for key generation by previously selected
oLFSR, i.e., t2ini ≤ t2L = t2rc. Thus, during any reset cycle t2rc,
pRNG generates n+ log2(P ) bits, while new selected oLFSR
skips n bits related to random seed h. Simultaneously with
initialization of new oLFSR, the previous oLFSR generates a
key part of length Lk bits only. Thus, the reset cycle is defined
as follows t2rc =
Lk
CL
≥ n+log2(P )CR + nCL and the minimal
required bit rate of pRNG as
C2R ≥ (n+log2(P ))CLLk−n (7)
Finally, the mean value for required bit rate of pRNG CR can
be defined with Eqs. (6), (7) and (5) as
CR =
1
P C
1
R +
P−1
P C
2
R. (8)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents a numerical analysis of the proposed
system. We define the optical line rate as C = CL = 100
Gb/s, and the length of optical data container (the unit of data
to be secured) as LM = 1.25 Gbits, akin to the OTN/WDM
container standard. We assume, that the attacker has access
to an ultra high speed computer such as the supercomputer
Aurora at 180 Petaflops [1], and set the reference value for one
decoding try of τ=10−18 sec. According to this assumption an
AES key of length 128 bit and 256 bit will be cracked after
≈ 1013 and ≈ 1051 years, respectively.
Fig. 4 shows the duration of BFA on encrypted optical
flow and required bit rate of pRNG defined by Eqs. (1) and
(8), respectively, as a function of oLFSR length n and amount
of parallel oLFSRs P , while the number of resets was set to
N = 100. An increase in length and in amount of oLFSRs
increases the security, while the proposed encryption system
significantly outperforms the AES 128 in computational secu-
rity and only oKG based on P = 2 oLFSRs of length from
5 to 27 shows worse performance. The system with 4 and 3
oLFSRs of length from 52 and 98, respectively, outperforms
AES 256 as well. We observe that the proposed oKG can
be effectively realized with 3 oLFSRs of length n = 5, i.e.,
15 flip-flops, whereby pRNG can operate at much lower bit
rate CR < 0.8 Mbit/s than optical line rate. Generally, the bit
rate of pRNG decreases with increasing number of oLFSRs
and decreasing oLFSR length, while the disadvantage is that
each oLFSR generates ever longer key part ki, which contains
cyclic repeated bit sequences, i.e., 2n − 1 << Lk. However,
that sequence repeat does not reduce the security level. The
increasing number of utilized oLFSRs allows to decrease the
oLFSR length by keeping the same computational security.
For example, oKG based on 3 OLFSR of length n = 5 can
provide the same time complexity for BFA (≈ 1023 years) as
oKG based on 2 oLFSRs of length n = 64.
We next study the required switching time of optical 1 :
P switch in oKG. As in case of AES 128, we assume that
the duration of BFA on proposed anonymization node must
be ≈ 1013 years. The Table I presents a time required for
switching between two oLFSRs defined by Eq. (3). As can be
seen, the speed of optical switch can be reduced by increasing
the number of oLFSRs (P ) and its length (n).
Fig. 5 shows the maximal key length Lk generated during
reset cycle and the required number of resets, per Eqs. (5) and
(4), respectively. With decreasing number of parallel oLFSRs,
Lk also decreases, and increases the number of resets up to
N = 123 for P = 2 and n = 5. However, the increasing
Fig. 4: Time for BFA and bit rate of pRNG vs. oLFSR length.
Number of oLFSRs (P )
oLFSR length (n) 2 3 4
5 109 µs 173 µs 218 µs
10 114 µs 180 µs 227 µs
15 119 µs 188 µs 238 µs
20 124 µs 197 µs 249 µs
TABLE I: Time trc for switching between oLFSRs.
oLFSR length increases the maximal key length up to LK =
13.5 Mbits and decreases resets N = 88, if P = 2 and n = 40.
We study in Fig. 6 the minimal bit rates of pRNG as defined
by Eq. (8). The results show that with an increased number
of oLFSRs, P , and with the decrease in its length n, decrease
the required bit rate of pRNG CR. For instance, the bit rate of
pRNG must be at least CR ≈ 0.032 Mb/s, if the line rate is
C = 100 Gb/s and oKG is implemented with P = 4 oLFSRs
of length n = 5. We observe that it is practical to utilize pRNG
at higher bit rates to generating additional bits, which would
in turn further improve the quality of key sequence.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed for the first time the practical
challenges of optical anonymous networking from the system’s
perspective, with new designs of optical key generation and
layered encryption at line rate. The results showed that pro-
posed optical anonymization components are promising as it
can be practically realized with 3 parallel oLFSRs of length 5
operating at 100 Gb/s to provide a high computational security
against deanonymization (privacy) attack, whereby the time for
switching between oLFSRs is in the range of microseconds.
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